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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
plaintiff or the defendant claims the privilege against self incrimina-
tion the court may properly strike his complaint or answer and enter
judgment against him. This interpretation indicates that the court
has placed "the penalizing construction" on the Rule. Under this con-
struction the Rule could operate to compel a defendant who has no
choice in bringing the action or in taking the stand to either incrimi-
nate himself or to have judgment entered against him. Were Rule 42
actually to be applied so as to confront a defendant with this choice
the question of the constitutionality of the Rule as applied could
then arise.
It is doubtful whether applying Rule 42 so as to compel a defendant
to make this choice in a state court would present a constitutional
question under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Con-
stitution.' However, the Rule so construed and applied could raise a
substantial constitutional question under the prohibition against com-




Accident-Determination of Number of Accidents in One Mishap.
The concept of proximate cause was used by the Washington Supreme
Court in -Truck Insurance Exchange v. Rohde' to determine
the number of "accidents" arising from a collision of four vehicles, in
an action brought by the Exchange to determine its liability under a
policy in which Rohde was the named insured.
Rohde, while driving under circumstances conceded to be negligent,
collided with three motorcycles. Rohde's car crossed the center line
and struck the first motorcycle, spun around and then collided with
two other motorcycles traveling in echelon formation seventy-five
feet apart. Rohde did not regain control of his car between the first
and last impacts.
7 The United States Supreme Court has held that the exemption from self incrim-
ination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed against abridge-
ment by the states by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
nor is it inherent in due process of law which the States are prohibited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908).
8 Art. I, § 9.




The insuring agreement contained the standard limit of liability
clause:
Bodily Injury Liability each person $20,000.00 each accident $50,-
000.00 Property Damage Liability each accident $5,000.00
Judgments had been entered against the insured in excess of the
$50,000.00 aggregate limit for one accident. The lower court found
in favor of the insured, Rohde, that there were three accidents. From
this finding the Exchange appealed. The Exchange contended that all
three impacts were the direct result of one negligent act and therefore
constituted a single "accident" under the terms of the policy. Rohde
based his opposing contention on the theory that the test was the effect
upon the persons injured rather than the cause of the impacts.
An insurance policy is a contract and the intention of the parties
controls.2 The court found that the parties contemplated injury to
more than one person or piece of property in one "accident". This
construction will probably have effect most frequently where there
was more than one person riding in a car when it is struck. There
was nothing, however, confining the application of the limiting clause
to persons riding in the same car. Nor was there any language adopting
the number of causes of action against the insured arising out of one
mishap as determinative of the number of "accidents". On this basis
the court held that the parties contemplated injury to more than one
person riding in different vehicles.
If an "accident" may involve more than one person and more than
one vehicle, the question remains of determining what is the unifying
factor which renders those separate injuries a single "accident" within
the meaning of the policy. The Washington Supreme Court used the
test of proximate cause. Relying on a California case, Hyer v. Inter-
Insurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California,3
and a Fifth Circuit case, Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Rut-
land," it held that all impacts resulting from one single, continuous
act constitute one "accident".
In the Hyer case, under almost identical facts and similar liability
limits, the California Court of Appeals considered the same contention
that Rohde made in the instant case, i.e. that the effect to the person
injured is the determining factor rather than the cause of the impact.
2 Silen v. Silen, 44 Wn.2d 884, 890, 271 P.2d 674 (1954).
3 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055 (1926).4225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955).
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The court recognized this view but expressly limited its application to
workmen's compensation cases, stating,
5
But as commonly used in Liability insurance policies, the word acci-
dent is predicated on an occurrence which is the cause of the injury.
(Emphasis added)
In the Rutland case, the insured collided with a train causing in-
jury to sixteen railroad cars belonging to fourteen separate owners.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the view that the
number of "accidents" is determined by looking at the collision from
the point of view of the persons whose property had been injured
rather than the cause of the accident, stating,
Considering only the policy involved here without reference to the
previous judicial interpretations, we think it clear that the word acci-
dent in the disputed phrase was intended to be construed from the
point of view of the cause rather than the effect. 6 (Emphasis added)
In the instant case the court held that a single proximate cause of
all three impacts was Rohde's negligence. Applying the rule of the
Hyer and Rutland decisions, the court determined that there was
one "accident" under the terms of the policy. By following these cases
the Washington Court has aligned itself with the majority view on
the subject.
The dissent argued that the Washington court had committed itself
to the effect test in Jeffries v. General Casualty Co. of America.,
In that case the court said,' "We are not concerned with the cause of
the accident but where it took place." However in the Jefferies case
the question was not whether or not there was an accident, but where
it took place. The case dealt with an exclusionary clause excepting
"accidents" not happening on the insured's premises. The negligent
hitching of trailer, which caused the accident, occurred on the insured
premises, but the actual accident took place elsewhere. In the Rokde
case, however, the question was how many accidents took place. The
rejection of proximate cause for the determination of where an "acci-
dent" took place is not a basis for rejecting the use of proximate cause
to determine the number of "accidents" in a multiple collision.
The dissent also believed that the word "accident" as used in the
contract was ambiguous and that the contract should be construed
5 77 Cal. App. 344 246 Pac. at 1057.
6 225 F2d at 692.
746 Wn.2d 543, 283 P.2d 128 (1955).
8 46 Wn.2d at 547, 283 P.2d at 131.
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in favor of the insured in accordance with the normal interpretation
of rules of insurance argeements.9 The majority on the other hand,
held that, reading the contract as a whole, the language used was not
ambiguous, and that the intention of the parties and what they desired
to accomplish was clearly expressed.
Of course, almost any language can be made ambiguous when
subjected to close and unfriendly scrutiny. It is the opinion of the
writer that the majority did give interpretation to the words as in-
tended by the parties and that there was no ambiguity. In the common
sense meaning of the word "accident" it is highly doubtful that anyone
witnessing the events in this case would have said, "I just saw three
accidents."
The Rohde case seems to commit the Washington Court to the
proposition that, unless "accident" is otherwise defined in an insurance
policy, the number of "accidents" arising from one mishap will be
determined by looking to the cause of the impacts. If conduct of the
insured is a single, proximate cause of injuries, uninterrupted by re-




Picketing-When Subject to Injunction as Coercive. In Audubon
Homes, Inc. v. Spokane Building and Construction Trades Council,1
the Washington Supreme Court determined the fate of organizational
picketing. The Court ruled that stranger picketing-picketing by a
union which has no members employed by the employer being picketed
-is coercive and unlawful. It makes no difference whether its purpose
is to force the employer to coerce his employees into joining the union,
or to force the employer out of business because his employees had not
joined the union.
Plaintiff, who was engaged in building new homes in Spokane, em-
ployed eleven non-union workers. Defendant union made an unsuccess-
ful attempt to organize the workers and finally resorted to picketing
the construction site with banners reading:
Non-Union Employees Working on This
DGuaranty Trust Co. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash. 683 294 Pac. 585
(1930).
1 149 Wash. Dec. 144, 298 P.2d 1112 (1956).
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